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n July 2011, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Massachusetts is-
sued an indictment for Aaron Swartz, an Internet activist and fellow at the 
Harvard Safra Center. The indictment alleged that Swartz had used a guest 
account to log in to servers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) and run a script to automatically download thousands of articles from JSTOR. 
After the activity was detected and his access blocked, Swartz took various measures 
to continue the downloading, including masking his IP and MAC addresses and, later, 
entering a server closet and directly connecting his computer to MIT servers. Based 
on these allegations, Swartz was charged with multiple federal crimes, among them 
violating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).1
The case received substantial media attention at the time of the indictment, again in 
the wake of Swartz’s suicide in January 2013, and once again in July 2013 when MIT 
released a report on the case and MIT’s involvement.2 Two features of the indictment 
are of particular interest for this paper. First is the basis for the charges. Swartz’s activ-
ity violated the terms of service for guest accounts at MIT and violated the terms of 
MIT’s license contract with JSTOR, which among other things prohibited automated 
downloading and downloading all articles in single issues of journals. Such unauthor-
ized access (or exceeding of authorized access) to “protected computers” (in other 
words, computers used in interstate commerce) provides grounds for charges under 
the CFAA.3 Hence, the case illustrates the potential reach and importance of license 
terms.4 Second, the actions leading up to the indictment involved monitoring of MIT’s 
Internet traffic to identify Swartz and understand his actions, illustrating that library 
This is a study of the treatment of library patron privacy in licenses for 
electronic journals in academic libraries. We begin by distinguishing four 
facets of privacy and intellectual freedom based on the LIS and philosophi-
cal literature. Next, we perform a content analysis of 42 license agree-
ments for electronic journals, focusing on terms for enforcing authorized 
use and collection and sharing of user data. We compare our findings 
to model licenses, to recommendations proposed in a recent treatise on 
licenses, and to our account of the four facets of intellectual freedom. We 
find important conflicts with each. 
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patron access to licensed electronic resources carries different privacy implications 
than (for example) print.
Although the Swartz case is an extreme example of unauthorized access to licensed 
materials, the case illustrates the centrality and scope of licenses for electronic journals 
in academic libraries. And in light of the case, it is worth asking just how licenses affect 
library patron privacy, whether any of those effects are problematic, and, if so, why?
This paper addresses each of these questions. We begin by examining whether, and 
why, we should care about library patron privacy in the first place. The Library and 
Information Studies (LIS) literature links privacy to the concept of intellectual freedom. 
But precisely what intellectual freedom is, and how it relates to privacy, require some 
clarifying. Drawing on the LIS literature on privacy and intellectual freedom and the 
philosophical literature on freedom, we distinguish four facets of intellectual freedom. 
We then turn to the question of how licenses treat patron privacy by performing a 
content analysis of 42 license contracts between publishers and academic libraries.
We analyze our findings by, first, comparing the language of the licenses to model 
licenses proffered within the library profession. We find that the licenses in our data 
set differ in important ways from the model licenses. We then compare the terms of the 
licenses to the recommendations set forth in Tom Lipinski’s recent treatise on library 
licenses for electronic resources.5 Here, too, we find important differences between the 
licenses in the data set and the recommendations. Next, we examine whether license 
provisions implicate the four facets of intellectual freedom we describe. We find that 
the licenses conflict with only certain aspects of intellectual freedom. We conclude with 
some recommendations for changes to licenses. 
The paper expands the existing scholarship on licensing in several ways. First, it 
explicitly links license terms to two central library values—privacy and intellectual 
freedom. Second, it links those core library values to the philosophical literature on 
privacy and freedom. Third, it shows a disconnect between the model licenses proffered 
by professionals and licenses that actually govern electronic journal access. 
Privacy and Four Facets of Intellectual Freedom
ALA, Privacy, and Intellectual Freedom
Privacy is a core library value, and it has been for some time. The first iteration of 
the American Library Association’s (ALA) Code of Ethics, adopted in 1939, posited 
that librarians have an “obligation to treat as confidential any private information 
obtained through contact with library patrons.”6 The most recent version of the code 
is similar, stating that librarians aspire to “protect each library user’s right to privacy 
and confidentiality with respect to information sought or received and resources 
consulted, borrowed, acquired or transmitted.”7 Although the Library Bill of Rights 
does not explicitly list rights to privacy and confidentiality, the ALA’s interpretations 
of the Bill are unequivocal that it serves as a basis for privacy protections. In “Privacy: 
An Interpretation of the Library Bill of Rights,” the ALA maintains that privacy and 
confidentiality are “integral” to the mission of libraries, and that rights to privacy 
and confidentiality are “implicit” in the guarantee of free access to all users in the 
Library Bill of Rights. It further explains that privacy rights are rights “to open inquiry 
without having the subject of one’s interest examined or scrutinized by others,” and 
that confidentiality demands that libraries keep “personally identifiable information 
about users … private on their behalf.”8 A separate interpretation specifically covering 
academic libraries places even greater emphasis on privacy: “The privacy of library 
users is and must be inviolable.”9
These statements of general principle are further specified to provide guidance in 
concrete cases. For example, the ALA explains that libraries have the responsibility 
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to protect not only patrons’ personal information, but also “database search records, 
circulation records, and other materials that identify a person’s use of library materials, 
activities, or facilities.”10 Moreover, the ALA interprets personally identifiable informa-
tion expansively to include “any data that can link choices of taste, interest, or research 
with a specific individual.”11 Protecting privacy reflects a “long-standing commitment 
to an ethic of facilitating, not monitoring, access to information.”12 The commitment to 
privacy demands more than simply restricting others’ access to patron information. 
It also requires that users be informed of “what policies and procedures govern the 
amount and retention of personally identifiable information, why that information is 
necessary for the library, and what the user can do to maintain his or her privacy.”13
The ALA’s commitment to protecting user privacy parallels language in other pro-
fessional association codes of ethics. For example, the Canadian Library Association 
(CLA) states that member libraries have the responsibility to “protect the privacy 
and dignity of library users and staff.”14 The International Federation of Library As-
sociations and Institutions (IFLA) Code of Ethics affirms that librarians should respect 
and protect users’ privacy, by requiring librarians to “take appropriate measures to 
ensure that user data is not shared beyond the original transaction.”15 In her analysis 
of the library association codes of ethics from 28 countries, Pnina Shachaf found that 
privacy is one of the “most global and common principles in the LIS profession.” 
Specifically, she determined that 85 percent of the codes of ethics in her study contain 
privacy protection.16 
The ALA and other professional organizations justify privacy protections by appeal-
ing to intellectual freedom.17 In the ALA’s words, intellectual freedom requires that 
one have the ability to “seek and receive information from all points of view without 
restriction” and “true freedom of inquiry” does not exist where “users recognize or fear 
that their privacy or confidentiality is compromised.”18 The IFLA Statement on Libraries 
and Intellectual Freedom also claims that one principle of freedom of expression is to “not 
disclose the identity of users or the materials they use to a third party.”19 A number 
of other library associations understand privacy protection to be a key component of 
intellectual freedom, including those from Croatia, Japan, New Zealand, Turkey, and 
United Kingdom.20 
Our discussion here focuses on privacy as it relates to intellectual freedom, follow-
ing the primary justification for privacy protections set out in professional codes of 
conduct in the United States (where the licenses in our data set come from) and in much 
of the LIS literature. There are, however, a number of other possible moral founda-
tions for privacy protections explored in the literature. For example, privacy may be 
instrumentally valuable as a part of personal relationships, mental health, professional 
transactions, and avoiding fraud; privacy may facilitate democratic processes; privacy 
may be a key component of human dignity; and privacy may be crucial in ensuring 
that important decisions about one’s life and projects be made for one’s own reasons 
and values.21 Many of these justifications for privacy protections overlap in important 
ways with intellectual freedom. 
Moreover, a number of commentators have argued that at least some aspects of 
privacy are of negative value. Richard Posner, for one, argues that privacy protections 
for individuals serve primarily to hide discrediting information that others could put 
to economically beneficial use.22 Others have pointed out that privacy protections have 
historically been deployed to the detriment of women and other minority groups by 
shielding oppressive actions in “private” spheres (such as the home or private com-
mercial enterprises), calling into question either the value of privacy per se or traditional 
interpretations of the nature and proper scope of privacy.23 Further, regardless of the 
underlying reasons for privacy’s value (if any), there is always a question of the degree 
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to which other goods warrant diminishing privacy. In recent years, for example, there 
has been significant debate about privacy and its relation to security,24 and there is a 
perennial question in U.S. law about the proper scope of privacy protections in the 
enforcement of criminal law. Addressing the full scope of the privacy literature is well 
beyond what we can do here. Nonetheless, because the connection between privacy 
and intellectual freedom is drawn so explicitly in the LIS literature, and because many 
accounts closely link privacy to freedom (either intellectual freedom or freedom more 
broadly), that is the focus of this project.
Four Facets
What, though, is intellectual freedom, and how does privacy affect it? While there ap-
pears to be some consensus that intellectual freedom includes freedom with respect 
to thought, belief, access to information, and exposure to ideas, there is not a settled 
view regarding what freedom means in this context.25 Positing that freedom just means 
lack of restriction does not get us very far, as that would leave open the question of 
what counts as a restriction in the relevant sense. Perhaps the lack of a settled view 
shouldn’t surprise us, as freedom is a deeply contested concept with a large philosophi-
cal literature. However, it is crucial that we make sense of it in order to address novel 
issues of intellectual freedom such as those under consideration here. Comparing the 
statements linking privacy to intellectual freedom in the professional literature to ac-
counts of freedom in the philosophical literature, we discern four facets of intellectual 
freedom that are implicated by privacy and privacy loss, each grounded in the LIS 
literature and each corresponding to a philosophical conception of freedom itself.26 
These will serve as a basis for our discussion of license content.
Negative Freedom
The starting point for understanding the four facets of intellectual freedom is to look at 
the most easily understood sense of freedom in the philosophical literature—negative 
freedom. Negative freedom is the freedom from external constraints. External constraints 
are restrictions on, costs to, or harms resulting from activities that are imposed by 
others and that limit a person’s ability to act in certain ways—in this case engaging in 
intellectual pursuits.27 For example, a law forbidding one from selling food without 
complying with health code regulations is a limitation on one’s negative freedom insofar 
as it imposes a constraint on a person’s ability to sell food that is imposed by others and 
independent of facts about the person who might sell food without compliance. Such 
a restriction is justified by health and safety outcomes; nonetheless, it is a restriction of 
freedom that demands some kind of justification. In the context of libraries and intel-
lectual freedom, we can see that censorship and Internet filtering diminish negative 
intellectual freedom insofar as they are restrictions imposed by others on persons’ 
abilities to access information. 
Loss of privacy does not by itself limit this facet of intellectual freedom. Rather, 
privacy may bear upon negative intellectual freedom instrumentally, as when others 
use information gleaned about a person’s intellectual pursuits to that person’s detri-
ment. For example, if Francis’s employer learned of his research into a serious medical 
condition, the employer might infer that Francis is prone to that condition and deny 
him some opportunity or position of responsibility. 
Positive Freedom
Not all of the concerns raised regarding privacy and intellectual freedom can be 
explained by the negative conception. For example, the ALA maintains that “true 
freedom of inquiry” does not exist where “users recognize or fear that their privacy 
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or confidentiality is compromised.”28 Likewise, a number of scholars have pointed 
to the potential for privacy loss to “chill” inquiry, regardless of whether persons 
who are monitored suffer any externally imposed, negative consequences from their 
loss of privacy.29 But chilling effects based on fear of privacy loss are not constraints 
imposed by others. Rather, they are based on a person’s psychology, which is internal 
to the person. To account for such effects, we can appeal to a different philosophical 
conception of freedom: positive freedom. Positive freedom refers to persons’ abilities 
to assert control over their lives regardless of whether there are externally imposed 
constraints. Often this is understood in terms of persons’ abilities to act according to 
their “higher” or more stable desires or the values of their more rational selves.30 So, 
an addict may be unable to control his actions when he needs a cigarette, despite his 
actual desire to not smoke and to do something other than go looking for a cigarette, 
and would to that degree lack positive freedom.
Apprehension of privacy loss and chilling effects based on beliefs regarding privacy 
loss are limitations on internal, positive intellectual freedom insofar as they do not rely 
on others actually imposing limitations on a person’s actions. Suppose, for example, that 
Jo believes that her library browsing and borrowing records are monitored. She worries 
that her coworkers, employer, or community would think ill of her if they knew that 
she reads controversial materials or (more prosaically) that she reads maudlin fiction. 
As a result, she does not browse or borrow such materials, even though she would like 
to. In that case, her activity is chilled not by constraints imposed by others, but by her 
own psychology. Hence, it is a limitation on positive intellectual freedom. Note that if 
her fears are the result of harms to her interests based on others actually thinking ill 
of her, the constraint would be external and hence a limitation on negative freedom.
Freedom and Autonomy
Other features of intellectual freedom cannot be explained by appeal to external, nega-
tive freedom or internal, positive freedom. Consider the ALA’s insistence that library 
patrons should be “informed what policies and procedures govern the amount and 
retention of personally identifiable information, why that information is necessary for 
the library, and what the user can do to maintain his or her privacy.”31 Merely inform-
ing patrons of how their information is collected does not protect their privacy per se. 
At most, it places the onus on patrons to take steps to protect their privacy, if they are 
willing to incur the opportunity costs of doing so. Further, it does not protect patrons 
from external constraints should they fail to maintain their information privacy. Nor 
does it protect internal positive freedom. Informing patrons of how their information 
may be collected or used could actually help cause chilling effects by making them 
“recognize or fear that their privacy or confidentiality is compromised.”32 
Moreover, appeals to the first two facets of intellectual freedom cannot explain two 
seminal conflicts regarding library patron privacy. One is the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation’s Library Awareness Program. In the late 1980s, the public learned that 
the FBI had a program in which agents would inquire at libraries about “suspicious” 
persons’ uses of materials and services and request circulation records. In response 
to the program, the ALA’s Intellectual Freedom Committee adopted formal policies 
regarding patron confidentiality and sought (though never received) in-depth infor-
mation about the extent of the program.33 The other is the USA Patriot Act’s expansion 
of “business records requests” pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. 
Section 215 of the Patriot Act allows federal agents to not only make records requests at 
libraries, but prohibits recipients from disclosing that such requests have happened.34
In both of these cases, a key issue for the library profession is the secrecy of the 
surveillance. But secrecy does not necessarily undermine negative freedom; it does 
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not make it any more likely that persons will suffer external constraints based on their 
library records. Moreover, the fact that surveillance is secret may actually mitigate any 
chilling effects of surveillance by making people less likely to believe that they are being 
surveilled.35 Here it is worth distinguishing secrecy of particular acts of surveillance, 
secrecy of surveillance programs, and secrecy of legal authorities for surveillance 
programs. Knowledge of any of these could affect people’s behaviors, and the mere 
fact that, say, particular acts of surveillance are secret may not mitigate the effects of 
a known surveillance program. The key point here, though, is that there does seem to 
be an affront to freedom where persons surveilled do not believe (and hence do not 
know) that they are being surveilled. 
To explain how informing patrons about retention and use of personally identifi-
able information and government powers to conduct surreptitious surveillance bear 
upon intellectual freedom, we need to articulate a third facet of intellectual freedom. 
John Christman has advanced the view that freedom is not simply a matter of absence 
of constraints, but a quality of agency.36 On this view, a person is free only if she acts 
autonomously. Precisely what autonomous action demands is itself deeply contested, 
but it at least demands that persons be able to act according to their values as they 
see fit. Internal and external constraints will matter to whether persons act autono-
mously—coercion, threats of harm, and inability to act on one’s more rational desires 
are all ways by which persons are limited in their ability to exercise autonomy.
However, autonomy demands more than simply being free of coercion and threats 
and having the wherewithal to act on one’s higher-level desires. For one, it requires 
information important in determining how to steer one’s choices to comport with one’s 
values, and it demands information important in making sense of how one is being 
treated.37 Consider, for example, a person who wishes to eat only foods that are not 
derived from genetically engineered (GE) organisms. This person is not forced into 
eating such foods, would be able to resist foods with ingredients derived from GE 
organisms, and has sufficient resources to purchase and prepare foods that are free 
of such ingredients. Suppose, though, that foods with GE ingredients are not labeled 
as such and that labels claiming foods do not contain GE ingredients are prohibited. 
There is an important sense in which one is not free to avoid GE foods because one 
does not have sufficient information to act on her desires as she sees fit. This is because 
she cannot exercise her autonomy in this regard.38
Interpreting intellectual freedom as requiring that persons be able to act autono-
mously can explain the importance of revealing to patrons the policies governing 
collection and use of their information. Likewise, it can account for why secrecy sur-
rounding Patriot Act business records requests and the FBI library surveillance program 
impinge on intellectual freedom, even if patrons never learn that their records have 
been accessed. That is because information about the possibility of one’s information 
being gathered is important to many people, and having relevant information is an 
important facet of autonomy.
Republican Freedom
The fourth facet of freedom relevant to our analysis is freedom from arbitrary exercise 
of power, sometimes referred to as republican freedom. The key idea is that, while one 
may be free in the sense of not having external constraints, being able to act in accord 
with one’s higher-order desires, and exercising autonomy, one might still lack an 
important facet of freedom where one could be subjected to arbitrary constraints or 
harms to one’s interests on the basis of another’s whims.39
Consider the example of a person living in an area that is largely controlled by 
organized crime. Legitimate authority is ineffective, businesses open and close at the 
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discretion of the criminal organization, people are dependent on the organization for 
money, and so forth. Now suppose that one is able to navigate life pretty well because 
one is in the good favor of the mob, can predict the behavior of the organization, and 
so forth, and that as a result one can do largely what she wishes. Hence, one would 
appear to be free on each of the conceptions described so far. Nonetheless, one could 
at any moment be subjected to harms based on the arbitrary whims of the criminal 
organization. A key insight of the republican conception is that such potential subjec-
tion to arbitrary domination is antithetical to freedom.
This fourth facet of freedom finds support from the ALA, which quotes Bruce 
Schneier’s view that monitoring creates the potential that “patterns we leave behind 
will be brought back to implicate us, by whatever authority has now become focused 
upon our once-private and innocent acts.”40 In other words, privacy loss need not chill 
inquiry to be problematic; rather, it is problematic where our intellectual inquiry—our 
“innocent acts”—can be used to our detriment, even if they are not so used. 
Frank Lovett’s prominent account posits that republican freedom is undermined 
where one party wields an imbalance of power over another, the party with less power 
would incur costs from exiting the relationship with the other party, and there is an 
absence of known rules or conventions governing use of power in that relationship, 
such that one party may wield that power arbitrarily.41 
Precisely what constitutes arbitrary power sufficient to undermine this facet of 
freedom is the subject of debate. However, one threat to republican freedom is broad 
and vague law that others can deploy to a person’s detriment. As Braithwaite and 
Pettit state in their seminal book on republican freedom and the criminal law, “[i]f the 
criminal justice authorities are not bound by precise criminal laws, then their power is 
relatively unchecked and there is a threat to the subjective component of dominion.”42 
This relatively unchecked power is closely related to Lovett’s absence of rules condition. 
That is, precise and tailored criminal laws constitute rules governing use of prosecu-
tor discretion. As we will explain later, the possibility of liability under the CFAA for 
exceeding authorized access of electronic resources appears to suffice for subjecting 
persons to arbitrary power.
Authentication and Authorized Use
Although the focus of this paper is on privacy and intellectual freedom, it is set against 
a backdrop in which licensors seek to limit access to copyrighted works to a group of 
authorized users and for a range of authorized uses and in which various technologies 
are deployed to control use. It is therefore worth pausing to clarify several aspects of 
authorized use and authentication. 
To begin, the line between authorized and unauthorized uses, especially for users 
who are unfamiliar with licenses, is not always clear. Despite provisions defining au-
thorized user and permitted/prohibited uses explicitly, there will inevitably be uses 
that are either unclear or are routine but unauthorized. For example, a person might 
be an authorized user in one capacity but not another, as when a student or faculty 
member works for a private company (including her own venture) “after hours” and 
her access advances that work. 
In other cases, uses that are widely accepted in scholarly communication might be 
prohibited by certain license provisions, which could easily lead to unauthorized uses. 
For example, fair use principles plausibly allow authorized users to share copyrighted 
work with research partners at other institutions (who are not authorized users); 
however, it is not uncommon for publishers to restrict sharing licensed materials with 
unauthorized users,43 since contract provisions “often take away fair-use or other rights 
which would otherwise exist under the copyright law.”44 As Eschenfelder et al state, 
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licenses in some cases “forbid activities that many end users would consider morally 
unproblematic,” such as occasional sharing with others (scholars, friends, family) not 
authorized under a particular license.45 Hence, where an authorized user is unaware 
of such a provision, she can easily breach the licenses inadvertently, and thus the user 
might have to face punishments from publishers or even charges of federal crimes 
based on the CFAA. While one major prerequisite of such charges is publishers’ ability 
to identify a certain user who conducts unauthorized uses, the authentication tech-
nologies libraries use may open an effective channel for publishers to obtain users’ 
personal information. 
Consider the two authentication technologies most commonly used by libraries 
today: IP filtering and proxy servers. Specifically, consider the types of user informa-
tion collected and maintained by libraries, by publishers, and by other relevant parties 
and how the technologies may affect user privacy.
 IP filtering is often used for on-campus users, where publishers compare the IP 
address of incoming requests with the IP addresses authorized under licenses and 
allow access only from those within an approved range.46 This allows publishers to 
capture a certain campus IP address and activities (for instance, databases accessed 
and articles downloaded) associated with that IP address. Campus IP addresses can be 
either static or dynamic. A computer with a static, or fixed, IP address (for example, in 
a faculty office or in a lab) is easy for a campus IT department to identify. A computer 
with a dynamic IP address, such as a student’s laptop connected to a campus’s wire-
less network, is randomly assigned to some available IP address each time it connects 
to the network. Although its IP addresses might vary from time to time, a campus IT 
department can generally track down a particular computer with some investigation. 
For instance, it can match activity from a particular session with either the username/
password used to log into the wireless network, or it can associate session information 
with a particular computer’s MAC address.
 Proxy servers envelop users’ requests within approved IP addresses. Thus, where 
proxy servers are used, the IP address communicated to a publisher is a university IP 
address, and not the IP address from which a user request originates (such as from 
home). Proxy servers are often deployed for off-campus users, but some libraries 
(including the authors’ home institution) also use proxy servers for their on-campus 
users. For off-campus uses, the proxy server requires users to provide a valid campus 
ID and password for the purpose of authentication.47 Thus, libraries’ proxy server 
log files collect information about users’ IDs/passwords, activities, and the mapped 
proxy IP address sent to publishers. For on-campus uses, libraries’ proxy servers keep 
users’ static/dynamic IP addresses and their activities in the log files, and a mapping 
between the users’ IP addresses and the IP addresses received by publishers’ server. 
In both cases, publishers only see that the IP address comes from the acceptable range 
without knowing the “real” IP address of a certain activity and thus cannot identify 
individual users based on the proxy IP address. 
So, even where IP filters and proxies are in use, information may be collected 
by libraries, publishers, and campus IT departments. Publishers may obtain such 
information from universities to the extent that they have the ability to require 
libraries and campus IT departments to provide user information. That can hap-
pen either because licenses provide that ability or via court order. To reduce such 
privacy risks caused by authentication technologies, many libraries purge their 
log files on a regular basis.48 Washing server log files on the campus IT side would 
also be necessary to prevent publishers from identifying a certain user through 
IP addresses. 
With this framework as a background, let’s turn to the licenses.
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License Analysis
Methodology
Data Set and Sampling
To evaluate licensing contracts with respect to privacy provisions and intellectual 
freedom, we conducted a content analysis of a set of licenses collected by Bergstrom, 
Courant, and McAfee for a study of journal pricing.49 Using state open records 
laws, Bergstrom et al. sent records requests to a large number of state university 
libraries throughout the United States. They received licenses from 38 universities 
and 8 consortia from 28 states, involving 11 different publishers. Bergstrom shared 
216 licenses on CD-ROM with Eschenfelder for a study of downloading, scholarly 
sharing, interlibrary loan, and e-reserves.50 We chose to analyze a sample of the full 
Bergstrom set because it is common in social science research to employ a random 
sample to represent a population that one does not have the resources to query. 
Moreover, Eschenfelder et al. found substantial repetition within the 216 licenses, 
which suggests that a subsample will capture most variances. Thus, we analyzed 
a subset of the 216 licenses. To better reflect current practices, we sampled licenses 
from 2007 to 2009.51 
Following Eschenfelder et al., we used final licenses rather than standard li-
censes in this study. Standard publisher licenses were drafted by publishers and 
presented to potential licensees as a basis for final licenses, and final licenses were 
those licenses negotiated between licensees and licensors.52 We selected 42 licenses 
from the data set using stratified sampling based on publisher to ensure capture of 
the variations in licenses across different publishers. We applied simple random 
sampling to draw a sample of 4 licenses from each of 10 publishers. We had only 
two licenses from the eleventh publisher (Wiley-Blackwell) and thus included 
both licenses in our data set. The demographic information about the sample is 
illustrated in table 1. 
TABLE 1





Wiley (WLY) 4 — 2 2
Blackwell (BLW) 4 3 — 1
Wiley-Blackwell (WBL) 2 — 1 1
Elsevier (ELV) 4 — 2 2
Emerald (EMR) 4 1 2 1
Sage (SGE) 4 3 — 1
Springer (SPR) 4 — 3 1
Taylor & Francis (T&F) 4 2 1 1
Non-commercial Publisher N=12
American Chemical Society (ACS) 4 — 3 1
Oxford University Press (OUP) 4 2 1 1
Cambridge University Press (CUP) 4 3 — 1
Total 42 14 15 13
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Codebook Development
To conduct a reliable content analysis of the sample licenses, we developed a codebook 
based on our literature review and a review of privacy clauses found in 3 standard e-
journal licenses available on the Internet. We revised the codebook based on 10 rounds 
of testing licenses selected from Bergstrom’s data set that were not part of the official 
study sample. During each test, we independently coded licenses and calculated the 
inter-coder reliability (ICR) of our results. In the last round of coding, we obtained 
98 percent ICR overall, higher than the targeted 90 percent. The minimum ICR at the 
question level was 75 percent.
The final codebook included 38 variables in five categories: monitoring authorized 
use/users, data collected by publishers, data shared with third parties, data sent to 
licensees, and personalized services. For most of the variables (27), we marked “1” if 
the statement was true, and marked “0” if it was not true. For the rest of the variables, 
we filled in free text to capture more complex information about the licenses.
Data Collection and Analysis
Each coder coded 25 licenses in total, among which 8 licenses were in common to 
calculate the ICR for the final coding. All the licenses were printed out and coded on 
paper. License coding ended in February 2013, and ICR for the 8 common licenses was 
calculated as 96 percent. The minimum ICR at the question level was 87.5 percent. All 
data collected in the coding were then imported to Excel for further analysis.
In addition, we compared the data to two model licenses developed by library pro-
fessionals: the LIBLICENSE model license and the license agreement checklist from 
the California Digital Library (CDL).53 We discuss differences between the data set and 
the model licenses in section 4.1. 
Findings 
Lipinski and Harris distinguish two primary areas in which privacy may be of con-
cern in licensing agreements: (1) enforcement of authorized use and (2) collection of 
personal information by licensors and sharing that information with third parties.54 
In addition, Magi addresses licensors offering personalized services that may in turn 
collect information about individual users.55 Our findings reflect this split, with privacy-
affecting provisions clustering around provisions for enforcing authorized use and 
for licensors’ collecting and sharing user data. We found only 2 licenses addressing 
personalized services.
Monitoring Authorized Use/Users
Most licenses authenticate users by IP address; therefore, most licenses specify that 
licensors will obtain IP address information from licensees. This authentication method 
in some cases provides a mechanism for enforcing license terms, as 16.7 percent of 
licenses state that licensors may suspend access of the IP address(es) from which un-
authorized use occurs. Another 9.5 percent of licenses stipulate that the licensor may 
suspend the access of any authorized user violating the terms of use, without speci-
fying the mechanism. In addition, several contracts have provisions either allowing 
(2.4%, 1 license) or even requiring (9.5%) that libraries suspend authorized user access 
upon request from the licensor. Ten licenses (23.8%), all from commercial publishers, 
that allow the licensor to suspend access also require (in at least some cases) that the 
licensor provide the licensee notice and time before suspending access, potentially 
allowing the library to remedy unauthorized use. 
A substantial number of licenses (38.1%) require that the licensee monitor for un-
authorized use of licensed materials.56 Further, 42.9 percent of licenses require that 
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libraries take disciplinary action when they become aware of unauthorized use. Just 
what constitutes “disciplinary action” is not spelled out in the licenses. Finally, the 
large majority of licenses (81%) oblige libraries to notify publishers when they become 
aware of unauthorized use. See table 2 for summary. 
Other Enforcement Provisions 
Along with the results of our content analysis, close reading of the contracts in the data 
set reveals a number of privacy-affecting terms that are relevant here. 
Several licenses have provisions regarding monitoring of use that warrant additional 
attention. Two licenses from Wiley/Blackwell require that “licensee shall use all rea-
sonable endeavors to monitor compliance” and report any unauthorized use or breach. 
That would appear to increase the licensee’s responsibility beyond the requirement 
of merely doing some sort of monitoring. Other licenses, including two licenses from 
Springer and one from ACS, reserve the licensor’s right to monitor access “to detect 
misuse of [publisher’s] content.” The ACS license states explicitly that it will engage in 
routine monitoring of each IP address authorized to access its materials: “[Publisher] 
will monitor the volume of searching and answer downloading activity associated with 
each Authorized IP Address on a routine bases, for the purpose of: (1) benchmarking 
what ‘average’ use is among Authorized IP Addresses, and (2) noting any significant 
variance in patterns of usage for particular Authorized IP Address(es).” This implies 
a degree of information gathering and specificity by the publishers greater than a 
provision simply stating that some monitoring will occur. Interestingly, an adden-
dum to one license from Oxford University Press makes explicit that the library will 
not monitor use, stating that “The Licensee does not have the ability to monitor or to 
control actual uses by authorized users of the information from the Licensed Materi-
als or to notify authorized users of all the restrictions on the use of information in this 
Agreement.” We found similar language in an addendum to an Emerald license from 
the same institution. 
TABLE 2
Terms Enforcing Authorized Use
 Total
N=42 Total % 
Licensor can suspend authorized user access based on violation of 
license*†
4 9.5%
Licensor can suspend access based on IP address*† 7 16.7%
Licensee may suspend unauthorized users† 1 2.4%
Licensee shall suspend unauthorized user based on request from 
licensor*
4 9.5%
Some suspensions require licensor to provide notice and time† 10 23.8%
Licensee shall notify publisher of unauthorized use 34 81.0%
Licensee shall monitor for unauthorized use 16 38.1%
Licensee shall take disciplinary action when aware of unauthorized 
use
18 42.9%
*Provision is included in the CDL model license.  
†Provision is included in the LIBLICENSE model license. 
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Thirteen licenses require that licensees maintain and share records of authorized 
users and their access details. The licenses do not specify precisely what details about user 
access are required; one possibility is that it includes user logs that can be correlated with 
the IP addresses requesting resources. Perhaps even more important for our purposes 
here, five licenses, including all of the four Emerald licenses and one from Wiley in 
2009, require libraries to share information about users and their activities with licen-
sors. As the Emerald licenses stipulate: “full and up-to-date records of all Authorized 
Users and their access details…shall be provided to [the publisher] upon request.”57 
In addition to provisions regarding information gathering, monitoring, and sharing 
to enforce license terms, six licenses (one Blackwell 2007 license, one ACS 2009 license, 
and all four Wiley licenses) require that libraries “cooperate” or “cooperate fully” with 
publishers’ investigations of copyright infringement and unauthorized use. 
Data Collection and Sharing
A second area that can implicate privacy interests is licensors’ data collection, analysis, 
and sharing information with third parties. As Lipinski notes, information is generated 
from database searches and downloads of licensed content and that information may 
be connected to particular patrons or particular computers.58 While similar information 
collected by libraries (for example, searches of an OPAC) would likely be protected 
from disclosure under many state library privacy statutes, such information is generally 
not protected by statute when collected by licensors (who are generally not covered in 
state library statutes).59 Hence, licensors may have the ability to collect, analyze, and 
even share information gleaned from searching and using licensed content.60 
As shown in table 3, we found that 66.7 percent of licenses state that publishers 
collect non-IP data, including (for example) usage data. We found that 26.7 percent 
of commercial licenses expressly allow publishers to share data with third parties. 
All but one of the licenses from noncommercial publishers are silent regarding data 
sharing with third parties—neither specifically allowing nor prohibiting data sharing. 
Perhaps most important is that a number of licenses explicitly limit the form or type 
of data that publishers may share with third parties. Table 4 shows that eight licenses 
(19.0%) specify that data shared with third parties is usage data. Five of these licenses 
expressly state that usage data shared with third parties should be in anonymous and 
aggregated form. Moreover, 31.0 percent of licenses specify that publishers may not 
share with third parties either raw usage data or data that can identify individual users.
A total of 9.5 percent of the licenses allowing publishers to share data with third 
parties specify the types of third parties with whom publishers can share data. For 
example, an Elsevier license states that it may provide data to “vendors or other third-
parties retained by the subscriber,” and a Wiley license states that it may provide data 
to third parties “where necessary in connection with services provided by appropriate 
TABLE 3
Terms Specifying Data Collecting
Total
N=42 Total % 
Non-IP data collected by publisher*† 28 66.7%
Specifying reasons for data collection 9 21.4%
Including deletion of collected data 1 2.4%
*Provision is included in the CDL model license. 
†Provision is included in the LIBLICENSE model license.
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intermediaries.” Several licenses (21.4%) specify the reasons that non-IP address infor-
mation is collected. These reasons include 1) assisting both licensor and participating 
library to understand the impact of this license; 2) improving the services provided by 
the publisher; and 3) internal use for the publisher and the licensee. It is unclear what 
the lifecycle of such data is, as just one license mentions the possibility of deleting data 
collected, stating that the deletion will occur “when [such data are] no longer needed.”
Data Sent to Licensee
Data about usage of electronic journals are extremely useful for libraries to calculate 
cost-effectiveness of specific products and to allocate resources appropriately. Many 
licenses (including both model licenses) oblige licensors to provide licensees with us-
age data. One important question is whether the data contain personally identifiable 
information. Contracts can ensure that usage data do not contain personally identifiable 
information by expressly stating that usage data will be provided in aggregated form; 
likewise, contracts can state that usage data will comply with the Counting Online Us-
age of Networked Electronic Resources (COUNTER) Codes of Practice, which includes 
some privacy protection.61 
As illustrated in table 5, we found that 38.1 percent of licenses require that usage 
data be in an aggregated form (either explicitly or by requiring COUNTER compli-
ance). We also found that 64.3 percent of licenses provide usage data to licensees, 
and 21.4 percent of the licenses include COUNTER-compliance provisions. Most of 
the publishers in this study are registered with COUNTER as providing COUNTER 
TABLE 4
Terms Specifying Data Sharing with Third Parties 
Total
N=42 Total % 
Contains terms about publisher sharing data with third party* † 14 33.3%
Specifies that publisher may provide data to third party*† 9 21.4%
Specifies the type of data that publisher may provide to third party*† 8 19.0%
Specifies the type of third party to which publisher will provide data*† 4 9.5%
Specifies that some data will NOT be provided to third party*† 13 31.0%
Specifies that publisher will disclose data to third party if required by law 1 2.4%
Requires third party to comply with the confidentiality provisions of license 1 2.4%
*Provision is included in the CDL model license.  
†Provision is included in the LIBLICENSE model license. 
TABLE 5
Terms Specifying Data Sent to Licensee 
Total
N=42 Total % 
Providing usage data to licensee*† 27 64.3%
COUNTER-compliance† 9 21.4%
Aggregated usage data*† 16 38.1%
*Provision is included in the CDL model license.  
†Provision is included in the LIBLICENSE model license. 
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compliant usage reports. Thus, their practices may comport with COUNTER practices 
regardless of whether such practices are made explicit in licenses. Also note that, even 
if licenses require the licensor to provide licensees with aggregated usage data, we 
cannot determine from the licenses whether or not licensors actually are able to collect 
usage data about individual users. 
Discussion: Is There Reason for Concern?
The next question motivating the paper is whether any of the privacy-affecting provi-
sions in licensing contracts are problematic. To address this, we compare our findings: 
first, to two model licenses established by library professionals; second, to recom-
mendations outlined by Lipinski (2013); and last, to the facets of intellectual freedom 
described above. 
Model Licenses
As noted, we recorded which provisions from our analysis of the data set were in 
the LIBLICENSE and CDL model licenses. Because the LIBLICENSE and CDL model 
licenses were developed by library professionals, they reflect considered professional 
judgments that presumably take into account both professional library values and the 
need to secure access to electronic journals through licenses. Hence, comparing them 
to the data set should reflect the extent to which professional values are reflected in 
actual license contracts.
The major difference between the model licenses and the actual licenses concerns 
libraries’ obligations when unauthorized use occurs. The actual licenses impose greater 
obligations on libraries. In particular, neither of the model licenses requires libraries 
to monitor for or notify publishers about unauthorized use. Nonetheless, we found 
38.1 percent of licenses have monitoring provisions, and 81 percent have notification 
provisions. Moreover, nearly half of the licenses in the data set (42.9%) oblige libraries 
to take disciplinary action when they are aware of unauthorized use, though neither 
model license contains such an obligation. 
These discrepancies between actual licenses and model licenses reflect different 
understandings regarding libraries’ role in addressing unauthorized uses. Publish-
ers, on one hand, have an interest in having libraries act in the publishers’ interest in 
preventing unauthorized use as much as possible. By contrast, at least some librarians 
are hesitant about incurring obligations to prevent unauthorized uses. Duranceau et 
al. argue that libraries should focus on user education rather than “policing of license 
breaches” and suggest libraries exclude license terms requiring “taking a specific dis-
ciplinary action” to avoid creating obligations to police for unauthorized use.62 These 
concerns are reflected in the model licenses developed by library communities, which 
do not contain any provisions requiring monitoring, notification, or disciplinary actions. 
Another important difference between model licenses and actual licenses is the 
requirements on data sharing. Both model licenses have clearly specified provisions 
to limit publishers’ ability to share usage data with third parties. Both specify that 
publishers may only share aggregated usage data with third parties and that raw 
usage data that can be used to identify individual users cannot be shared with third 
parties. Only a small percentage of the licenses in our data set specify the data type 
that can be shared with third parties, and most of the licenses are silent with respect 
to data sharing (hence not prohibiting it).
Conflicts with Lipinski (2013)
Lipinski’s discussion of privacy implications of common licensing provisions pro-
vides a further point of comparison for the data set. He maintains that requirements 
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for the “reporting of infringers raises issues of privacy” and suggests that a “kinder, 
gentler” approach is a more general affirmation that licensee assistance in halting 
abuses would “be appreciated.”63 He also suggests that, instead of an obligation to 
notify the licensor of all infractions, libraries should be able to address the infraction 
without having to contact the licensor, and hence have the option for a “teachable 
moment.”64 Most licenses (81%) in our data set, however, treat licensee’s notifica-
tion of unauthorized uses as an obligation, without an option to address infractions 
themselves. Lipinski further recommends, in cases where licensors have the right to 
terminate authorized user access, that they provide the licensee with notice and op-
portunity to remedy violations before terminating use. Only a few licenses (23.8%) 
in our set have such provisions. 
Lipinski points out that clauses requiring that libraries assist in the investigation and 
enforcement of licensing provisions may run afoul of state library privacy protection 
laws, for providing information would generally involve divulging patron information. 
He suggests inserting a clause in contracts that indicates that libraries will not divulge 
protected information in enforcing contract terms. As noted earlier, we found several 
licenses requiring libraries “cooperate” or “cooperate fully” with publishers’ investiga-
tions of copyright infringement and unauthorized use. We did not capture clauses in 
any contracts indicating that libraries would not divulge protected information, and 
we are not aware of any such provisions from our close reading of the licenses. In ad-
dition, Lipinski recommends that licenses require licensees to give users reasonable 
notice of terms and enforce license terms at levels consistent with other institutional 
policies.65 Likewise, we did not capture such terms in our coding and are not aware of 
any such provisions from our close reading. 
Four Facets of Intellectual Freedom 
So there are ways in which the licenses in our data set are in at least some tension with 
statements of professional library values. But so what? To analyze whether the potential 
privacy issues in licensing contracts are indeed a problem, we have to analyze them 
in light of the underlying justifications for privacy protections in the library context—
intellectual freedom. The picture here is more complicated. As we have established, 
we can distinguish four facets of intellectual freedom. Licensing provisions implicate 
only some of these, to varying degrees. 
Negative Freedom
Consider first negative freedom, or freedom from external constraints. Recall that 
privacy may bear upon negative intellectual freedom insofar as others may use in-
formation gleaned about a person’s intellectual pursuits to that person’s detriment. 
It does not appear that any of the contract terms outlined impinge upon this facet of 
intellectual freedom. Nothing in the monitoring provisions suggests that publishers or 
third parties will harm individual users of electronic resources based on the content of 
their research, and it is difficult to see why there would be any incentive to do so. One 
might argue that monitoring and reporting will indeed impose costs on some persons 
insofar as those who violate authorized use terms may lose access privileges. That, 
however, would not be a restriction on the content of one’s intellectual inquiries, but 
on the form they take. Put another way, whatever external constraints are applied to 
persons based on their research activities would be content neutral in the same way 
that late fees might place external constraints on persons’ research activities, but not in a 
way that is plausibly an impingement of intellectual freedom. Intellectual freedom does 
not include the ability to conduct inquiry in any manner that one wishes. Constraints 
on time, place, and manner (at least where those are not onerous and are justifiable 
442  College & Research Libraries May 2015
as means of ensuring overall broader and easier access) are compatible with negative 
freedom. Indeed, the ALA considers them compatible with intellectual freedom.66 
There is some concern, though, insofar as provisions for monitoring could be 
used as sources for investigation. For example, requirements that libraries keep us-
age logs and provide information to publishers seeking to enforce authorized use 
terms will make such retained information available for, for instance, subpoenas. 
This type of concern is nothing new, though, as any library record is subject to such 
information requests.
Positive Freedom
Consider next positive freedom, or the “true freedom of inquiry” that is imperiled, 
where “users recognize or fear that their privacy or confidentiality is compromised.”67 
Some types of license provisions potentially conflict with this facet of intellectual 
freedom. One concerns policing for unauthorized use. Libraries are in many cases 
required to monitor for, report to publishers, and discipline unauthorized use, and 
publishers may maintain records of IP addresses of persons accessing licensed materi-
als, which are in some cases able to be linked to particular computers. A few licenses 
require that libraries maintain and share records of authorized users and their access 
details, and at least one stipulates that “full and up-to-date records of all Authorized 
Users and their access details…shall be provided to [the publisher] upon request.” 
Such use records can potentially be correlated with unauthorized activity. Recall the 
license explicitly stating that it will engage in routine monitoring of each IP address 
authorized to access its materials: “[Publisher] will monitor the volume of searching 
and downloading activity associated with each Authorized IP Address on a routine bases, 
for the purpose of: (1) benchmarking what ‘average’ use is among Authorized IP 
Addresses, and (2) noting any significant variance in patterns of usage for particular 
Authorized IP Address(es).”
These license terms could constrain internal, positive freedom insofar as they could 
cause patrons to believe that they lack privacy, which may in turn lead them to limit 
their inquiries. That is, the degree of required and potential monitoring, if known, could 
serve to chill use. But the potential limits on internal positive freedoms are merely 
speculative. The extent to which privacy loss affects persons’ behavior is difficult to 
measure, and it is plausible that people become so accustomed to privacy loss that 
remote monitoring does not actually affect their behavior. Moreover, it is likely that 
most users of electronic journals in academic libraries do not know whether, or the 
degree to which, their use is actually monitored. After all, license provisions are not 
widely publicized (the licensing contracts in our data set, for example, were disclosed 
pursuant to open records requests), and the licenses only reveal that some monitor-
ing takes place. The intensity and precision of that monitoring remains unclear and is 
likely to vary by publisher and by library. Thus, patrons may not know enough that 
monitoring actually affects their behavior.
That is a fairly powerful argument that monitoring provisions in licensing contracts 
do not undermine internal, positive intellectual freedom. If it is true that no one actually 
alters their inquiries based on monitoring because they are unaware of monitoring, 
then there would not appear to be any limitation on persons’ internal, positive intel-
lectual freedom. For actions to be chilled requires that persons be aware of monitoring 
and for that awareness to have some effect upon their behaviors. If monitoring is well 
hidden or if persons are simply unaware of it, then there will be correspondingly less 
concern about chilling effects and internal positive freedom. Indeed, if chilling effects 
were the sole concern of intellectual freedom, there would be a strong case against 
disclosing monitoring activities.
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Freedom and Autonomy
Because it is unlikely that patrons have a clear idea of how much of their activity is 
actually subject to monitoring, the license provisions implicate the third facet of intel-
lectual freedom, or quality of agency. Recall that this facet is at root about individual 
autonomy, or the ability to act according to one’s own reasons as one sees fit. Autonomy 
in turn requires information important in determining how to steer one’s choices to 
comport with one’s values, and it demands information important in making sense 
of how one is being treated. To the extent that licensing provisions require or allow 
monitoring and data collection, and to the extent that such actions matter to patrons, 
this facet of intellectual freedom demands disclosure of those provisions. Whether users 
are actually aware of the degree to which their uses may be monitored and information 
collected is unclear, but license terms are obscured in a number of ways. They are in 
the relatively difficult language of contracts; they may require open records requests to 
see (and if they are not licenses involving public institutions, such requests are not an 
option); they differ across publisher and license; interpreting them demands knowledge 
of the underlying technologies and institutional practices of libraries and publishers. 
The upshot is that surveillance will implicate a different facet of intellectual freedom 
depending on whether it is overt (which will implicate internal, positive freedom) 
or covert (which will implicate freedom-as-agency). Thus, the fact (if it is a fact) that 
persons using electronic journals are unaware of the degree to which their uses are 
monitored is not sufficient to conclude that their intellectual freedom is unimpinged. 
Republican Freedom
A different potential concern bridges privacy and authorized use. In the separate section 
of the paper, we describe a number of ways in which uses may conflict with the terms of 
licensing agreements and a number of uses that appear both routine and unauthorized. 
This is significant in two ways. One is that licensing terms provide bounds of criminal 
conduct.68 Under the U.S. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), any person who 
“intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, 
and thereby obtains…information from any protected computer” may be subject to 
criminal and civil sanction.69 This is one of the statutes under which Aaron Swartz was 
charged. While Swartz’s actions involved large-scale downloading and attempts to mask 
his identity, at root those actions are relevant because they are instances of exceeding 
authorized use. That is, Swartz’s actions fall within the purview of the CFAA based 
upon licensing terms. Moreover, license terms both set the bar for unauthorized access 
well below what happened in the Swartz case, are vague about what precisely exceeds 
authorized access, and in some cases seem to prohibit mundane types of access. Hence, 
there is a legally plausible case for criminal conduct and civil liability for activities that 
are either within, or not far outside, norms of scholarly activity. 
A second reason this is significant is that licenses generally provide that users may 
lose authorization to access materials based on violations of license terms. Further, 
publishers may monitor the activities of individual users and may retain that informa-
tion over time. Licenses almost all stipulate that they retain the right to enforce those 
provisions, even if at times they fail to enforce license provisions. This combination 
exposes users to restrictions on use (and both criminal and civil liability) in the future 
based on data collected in the past. The potential for enforcement, either by restriction 
of use in the undefined future or for criminal charges, implicates the fourth facet of 
freedom—freedom from arbitrary power.
As discussed, Lovett outlines three conditions under which republican freedom 
is limited, such that one may be subject to arbitrary power: an imbalance of power, 
a “dependency” relation, such that costs would be incurred by the party with less 
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power by exiting the relationship, and an absence of known rules or conventions 
governing use of power.70 In the case of users and publishers and prosecutors, there 
does seem to be a difference in power; individuals have less power than publishers 
and prosecutors. And users of university libraries would incur substantial costs by 
not using electronic resources for their research. These conditions by themselves are 
unproblematic, though. It is only with the further presence of the third condition that 
republican freedom is limited.
Is there, then, an absence of known rules or conventions governing use of power? 
The Swartz case does suggest an absence of known rules or conventions. Prior to 
the Swartz case, there do not appear to have been indictments under the CFAA for 
unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, of materials licensed by librar-
ies, and the indictment under the CFAA was surprising to many people. Further, the 
principal parties did not express support for the prosecution in the first place. JSTOR 
indicated that, once its documents had been secured, it “had no interest in [the case] 
becoming an ongoing legal matter,” and MIT expressed no statement regarding the 
merits of prosecution at all.71 Hence, there does not appear to be a rule or convention 
that excessive downloading would be subject to criminal charges. Now, a number 
of commentators have argued that the charges were legally cognizable under the 
language of the CFAA, and one might argue that the law itself provides the kind of 
rule governing the use of power that is necessary for republican freedom. But, even 
if we assume that is the case, whether the charges were supported by the law is a 
separate question from whether the exercise of prosecutor discretion to bring the 
charges was itself within rules or conventions surrounding unauthorized use, or 
exceeding authorized use, of licensed materials. After all, both the law itself and its 
application may be so broad as to be arbitrary. Moreover, to say that rules or conven-
tions exist surrounding discretionary prosecution just in virtue of the fact that the 
law supports prosecution would entail (implausibly) that laws or the use of laws is 
by definition nonarbitrary. Moreover, it would assume the answer to the very question 
we are asking in this section, that is to say, whether it is an arbitrary exercise of power 
to use the CFAA to bring charges for unauthorized use or exceeding authorized use 
of licensed resources. 
The facts of the Swartz case, however, are extreme—large-scale, automated down-
loading that Swartz likely knew to conflict with license terms. That looks nothing like 
the kind of mundane violations we have described, and one might argue that such 
low-level offenses would never be prosecuted in the way Swartz was. On the republican 
conception of freedom, however, it is not actual interference that limits liberty, but the 
ability of others to interfere arbitrarily (even if they don’t). That is the force of the mob 
example: the mere fact that one happens to steer clear of mob interference does not entail 
that one is free of the mob, for without effective legal authority controlling the mob, 
it has the ability to exercise its power over others arbitrarily. Regardless of whether it 
is justifiable to prosecute actions such as Swartz’s, the language of the CFAA is broad 
enough that comparatively minor cases could also be subject to criminal sanctions or 
civil liability. Up to this point, they haven’t been prosecuted, but the ability to do so is 
what limits republican freedom. Moreover, even if there were explicit rules adopted 
by the U.S. Department of Justice not to prosecute these sorts of unauthorized uses, the 
CFAA still imposes civil liability. Hence, there would remain the possibility of licensors 
suing library patrons for unauthorized access or exceeding authorized access, which 
also would appear to meet the three conditions for being subject to arbitrary power. 
It is certainly true that the extent to which arbitrary power can be exercised is less in 
the civil liability case than in the criminal case. That, however, only tells us that this 
fourth, republican, facet of freedom admits of degree.72
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Now, one might argue that this is not about privacy, but instead about authorized 
access provisions and the scope of the U.S. criminal code. It is correct that the primary 
concern is that license terms underwrite criminal and civil liability. However, because 
of the requirements that libraries monitor and notify publishers about unauthorized 
use, and in some cases are required to maintain relevant information and cooperate 
with investigations, the provisions affecting privacy are mechanisms by which this 
fourth facet of intellectual freedom is affected. 
Summary and Recommendations
To sum up, our data indicate that licenses conflict with at least some language advanced 
by the ALA, with some aspects of two model contracts developed by library profes-
sionals, and with recommendations set out by Lipinski. Whether they conflict with 
the underlying value justifying privacy protections—intellectual freedom—depends 
on the facet of intellectual freedom. It is difficult to see how they conflict with nega-
tive intellectual freedom or internal, positive freedom. However, the likelihood that 
patrons are unaware of privacy-affecting provisions, and the difficulty of figuring out 
just how privacy is affected by use of electronic resources, creates an important conflict 
with the quality-of-agency facet of intellectual freedom. Moreover, the relationship 
between unauthorized access, or exceeding authorized access, and criminal and civil 
liability, the possibility of losing access to licensed material, publishers’ ability to gather 
information about unauthorized access, and libraries’ obligations (in some cases) to 
monitor, notify about, and collect information about such use, create an important 
conflict with the fourth facet of intellectual freedom, or freedom from arbitrary power.
There remains, however, an important question about whether such tensions be-
tween licenses and the values of the library profession are sufficient to justify the risk 
of being unable to reach agreement on license terms and thus risking patron access 
to licensed resources. Likewise, it is unclear whether it would be worth paying more 
for licenses that provide greater privacy protections. After all, failing to provide such 
resources may also limit intellectual freedom.73 Nonetheless, there are several things 
that are worth considering. 
First, libraries should ensure that contract terms pertaining to data collection, data 
sharing with third parties, and monitoring and disciplinary actions for unauthorized 
use are transparent to users. Although most users are unlikely to peruse the terms 
of licenses, making the terms readily available is a necessary (though not sufficient) 
condition for respecting the autonomy of patrons and thus for supporting the quality-
of-agency facet of intellectual freedom. Related, libraries should seek to make privacy-
affecting provisions similar across licenses. The fact that contracts are so different from 
publisher to publisher makes it all the more difficult for users to know what provisions 
are in effect. Next, libraries should resist license terms obliging them to monitor for 
unauthorized use, and they should make clear in licenses where they do not have the 
ability to identify individual users. 
In fact, libraries would go a long way to securing intellectual freedom (in all its facets) 
by implementing several of Lipinski’s suggestions. For example, rather than notifications 
requirements, libraries could push for provisions allowing them to correct unauthorized 
access issues “in-house.” Related, libraries could push for provisions such that licensors 
can terminate authorized access only were they provide licensees with notice and the 
opportunity to remedy violations. Libraries might also specify in contracts that they 
will not provide individual user information in any case, regardless of any language 
suggesting that they will “cooperate” or “cooperate fully” with publishers’ investiga-
tions of copyright infringement and unauthorized use. And they could specify that any 
information shared with third parties be in anonymous and aggregate form.
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Last but not least, libraries can reduce the privacy risks associated with investigat-
ing unauthorized uses in multiple ways. The first step is to adopt privacy-preserving 
authentication technologies such as Shibboleth (as many libraries already do) to reduce 
the user information directly obtained by publishers. Then both libraries and campus 
IT departments should regularly purge the records kept in their servers to minimize 
the amount of user information that could be requested by publishers to a great extent.
We would like to thank Kristin Eschenfelder, Dorothea Salo, Sue Dentinger, Bryce Newell, 
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